Hierarchy is a necessary and integral part of religious fundemenatlism (Barzilai, 2003; Weber, 1964/1922; Liebman, 1993 cited in Barzilai, 27) which ensures that a small group of elites controls the flow and interpretation of information (Spigelman, 2000 cited in Barzilai 27); therefore the Internet, a tool that allows the free-flowing of thoughts and ideas, would naturally threaten this dimension. Elites of fundementalist groups (i.e. Amish or Muslim Radical groups) sometimes believe the "internet poses a threat to the community's culture and challenges their legitimacy"(Barzilai, 27), as a result, Barzilai and Barzilai-Nahon explain, censorship or complete prohibition of technological infrastructure are implemented to maintain control (Barzilai-Nahon, 2004 cited in Barzilai,27). However, even the most orthodox and fundementalist communities frequent the Internet (Spigelman, 2000; Dawson, 2000; et al. cited in Barzilai,27); and therefore Barzilai and Barzilai-Nahon demonstrate how some religious elites have embraced technology and used it as a "means of personalization and contextualization" (Barzilai-Nahon, 2004 cited in Barzilai, 27).

      Literature on gender-based digital divide is split, some say a digital divide exists between men and women (Goulding & Spacey, 2002; Bimber, 2000; Hoffman et al., 2000; Ono & Zavodny, 2003 cited in Barzilai, 27), others say a gender gap does not exist (Lebo, 2003; Glasner, 1999 cited in Barzlai, 27) however recent studies show a gender gap in the frequency and intensity of internet use rather than acces to the internet (Ono & Zavodny, 2003 cited in Barzilai). Ramos (2002) argues that "the Internet has not revolutionized religious fundementalist communities, since women's frequency and intensity of usage  are more confined compared to men"(cited in Barzilai 2004) therefore Barzilai and Barzilai-Nahon conclude that the internet has created "better opportunities for feminine voices to be heard in religious fundementalist contexts"(i.e. Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan) even if they are framed within the communal context and its heirarchy (Barzilai 27).

       Fundementalist behaviour is based on sacred texts and hermeneutics that surround them, therefore these individuals live a very disciplined lifestyle (Barzilai, 2003 cited in Barzilai, 28). According to Barzilai and Barzilai-Nahon, hypertext is "interactive, non-linear, associative, not-fixed and not necessarily owned by an identified single author"(Barzilai, 28), therefore it poses a threat to basis of Fundementalist beliefs which are based in sacred printed texts which Willis (1999) defines as  having a "particular focus, a clearly defined audience and a single [attributable] voice..." (cited in Barzilai, 27). However, Barzilai and Barzilai-Nahon explain, using the prevalence of Muslim sermon's online, hthat the Internet "can be culturally constructed in ways that adapt it to religious fundamentilist discipline" (Barzilai, 29) and help extensively enhance it as is the case for Islam (Adamu, 2002; Bunt, 2003 cited in Barzilai, 29).

       Traditional thought would assume that seclusion, a key component of a fundementalist community's collective identity, would be reduced by the Internet, however Barzilai and Barzilai-Nahon propose that  the cyber-space may enhance a community's seclusion (Barzilai, 30). Refering to the Pew Internet & American Life Project(Larsen, 2001 ctied in Barzilai, 30), Barzilai and Barzilai-Nahon argue that "most religious [online] surfers (67%) use the internet to gather information about their own faith and not to learn about other religions (Barzilai, 30). However, Barzilai and Barzilai-Nahon concede that despite the most rigid controls, censors and prohibitions, idividuals will manage to "reach alternative content that may be unacceptable in their own religious context" and therefore may result in reduced suclusion (Barzilai, 30).

Works Cited

            Barzilai, Gad; Barzlai-Nahon, Karine. "Cultured Technology: The Internet and Religious Fundamentalism". The Information Society, 2005; 21: p.25-40.

Aura's Summary

    In “Political Culture, Regulation, and Democratization: The Internet in NIne Asian Nations," Kluver and Banerjee (2005) discuss the Internet’s role in the potential democratization of Asian politics and examine the critical factors (“political culture, regulatory regimes, and unequal levels of access to information technology” (qtd. para.11)) that constrain this potential by focusing on regionally and governmentally distinct nations in Asia (China, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, India) (para.11).

    Utilizing Pye’s (1985) statement that “[the] potentialities and …limitations [of social power] are always constrained by time and place” (qtd. in Kluver & Banerjee para.18), Kluver and Banerjee emphasize that is necessary to consider the issues that structure a nation’s political culture (“symbolic environment of political practice, shaped by historical experiences and philosophical and religious traditions” (Kluver 2005, para.18)) in “theorizing” the Internet’s impact on political practices (para.18) Internet in Singapore's political culture plays a less effective role on the political processes of the nation partially due to the country's "commitment to non-corruption" (Kluver & Banerjee para.23). Malaysia and Indonesia, on the other hand, have deployed the Internet much more effectively with uses such as online news sites containing non-mainstream press and a space available without the constraints of authoritarian democracy (Kluver & Banerjee para.24). Kluver & Banerjee explain that such examples of political culture in nations show that the Internet has an indirect effect on countries with a more authoritarian political culture, and in those nations without democratic mechanisms, the Internet allows for the expression of political opinions and overall political participation (par.26).

    Despite the opportunities that the Internet offers in the process of democratization, Asian governments undermine its potential by continual regulation of online media content—specifically, political communication—through a variety of methods (Kluver & Banerjee para.27-28). An example is China’s successful implementation of methods to filter out undesirable content and censor the websites accessible to their nation (Chase and Mulvenon 2002; Kalathil & Baos 2003, cited in Kluver & Banerjee para.28), as well as the country’s accomplishment in working with providers of information technology structure to eliminate anonymity on the web (Walton 2001, cited in Kluver & Banerjee para.28) and keep surveillance on potential undermining of its Communist Party. (Kluver & Banerjee para.28). Singapore, on the other hand, is not as extensive in Internet censors as China; the nation, however focusses more on the regulation over political speech by appointing the sponsors of the sites legal liability for their content—highly emphasizing on possible lawsuits the sponsors may encounter (Kluver & Banerjee para.29). In Japan, as well as in South Korea, the effectiveness of political campaigns is limited by regulation of Internet accessibility and citizen use; more specifically, websites cannot be updated a month before an election (Kluver & Banerjee para.31).

    Kluver & Banerjee address another constraint in the Internet’s power with the discussion of the “tremendous gap in information access,” an issue that not only exists in China but in Western nations as well (para.33). Although Internet access in countries is increasing at a high rate, several obstacles are introduced with the use of the Internet for political purposes, such as nations’ lack of electricity and the requirement of computer literacy (Kluver & Banerjee para.35). Computer illiteracy itself presents a digital divide as “some citizens gain greater access to information, those on the lower rungs fall even further behind,” particularly in the economical and social sense (Kluver & Banerjee para.35). With that in mind, Kluver and Banerjee post an important question concerning the definition of democracy: “If access to the Internet is limited to the elite, typically with higher education, higher economic and social status, and access to advanced technologies, then how ‘democratic can it be said to be?” (qtd. para.36). While the internet aids in the mobilization and organization of areas of society, the realization that “real political power remains in the hands of the elites” prove that politics become less democratic (Kluver & Banerjee para.36).

    In conclusion, while the introduction of the Internet increases the number of opportunities for mobilization in developed nations, unfortunately, the Internet has no impact on politics and the power of ordinary citizens in less developed countries (Kluver & Banerjee para.40). Kluver and Banerjee, however, also note that although the Internet itself does not create a more democratic environment, “democratic and community organizations gain the ability to provide alternative perspectives and mobilize citizens” (qtd. para.45) and also allow for the emergence of “new configurations of power” (para.45).

Works Cited

Kluver, Randolph & Banerjee, Indrajit. "Political Culture, Regulation,

and Democratization: The Internet in Nine Asian Nations."

Information, Communication & Society Vol. 8, No. 1

March 2005. 46 pars. 12 March 2007

http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=7&hid=12&sid=068000f4-a07c-47ff-93cc-b0704005e45a%40sessionmgr2

    By controlling the physical access to Internet some regimes are able to control the public access of information, such examples of regimes are: North Korea, where public Internet access is prohibited; Cuba , where public Internet access is restricted to some universities and employers; and Myanmar, where there is no public Internet access and the private Internet users must acquire a license (687).  Other regimes have opted to use proxy servers as "censoring tools" such as Singapore and Saudi Arabia or even gone to the extent China has gone by  shutting down websites, discussion groups or blocking any websites linked with the word 'freedom' or 'democracy'  (Holloway 2002 , cited in Guillen and Suarez 687). Even more concerning, regimes such as Vietnam and China have taken control a step further by reprimanding Internet users physically and politically as reported by some sources (Abbot 2001; Cooper 2000; Taubman 1998, cited in Guillen and Suarez 687).

    Guillen and Suarez state that Internet is not the agent of spontaneous change to "render disadvatanged countries and firms competitive" or spread democracy around the world and that the digital divide among countries is not only product of purely economical factors but also of sociopolitical context of each country (697). To conclude, Guillen and Suarez's insightful research and conclusions has closed one of the knowledge gaps to our understanding of politics behind digital literacy and digital divide. In order to pursue further understanding of this issue we should ask the question elaborating on the knowledge deficit Guillen and Suarez acknowledged, which is: What are the political consequences digital literacy has had on people under authoritarian regimes?

Works Cited:

Guillén, M. F., & Suárez, S. L. (2005). Explaining the global digital divide: Economic, political and sociological drivers of cross-national internet use.

      Social Forces,84(2), 681-708. Retrieved from <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/social_forces/v084/84.2guillen01.pdf >